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Minimum Wages and the Demand for Labor
ABSTRACT
I formulate measures of the effective minimum wage, based on broad
definitions of the labor costs that face employers, and use these measures
in reestimating some simple equations relating the relative employment of
youths and adults to the U.S. minimum wage using aggregate data for 1954—78.
I then ground the model more closely in the theory of factor demand, first
by adding the relative wages of youths and adults to the equation describing
their relative employment, and then by specifying a complete system of
demand equations for these two types of labor. Teen employment responds
quite robustly to changes in the effective minimum in these specifications,
with an elasticity of —0.1. A translog cost function defined overyoung
workers, adults, and capital shows that the effective minimum wage reduces
employers' ability to substitute other factors for young workers. Using
both sets of results, I find that a subminimum wage for youths would have
increased their employment with at most a small loss of jobsamong adults.
Daniel S. Hamermesh




The vast amount of research on the effects of the minimum wage on
employment requires that we justify the presentation of additional results.
Economists have examined the issue: (1) Recognizing the importance of
incomplete and changing coverage of the minimum (Kaitz, 1970; Goldfarb, 1974);
(2) Considering how to define the real effective minimum wage in a manner
consistent with economic theory (Welch, 1974); and (3) Acknowledging the
role played by spillovers and turnover in completely and incompletely covered
markets (Hashimoto—Mincer, 1971; Welch, 1974). Yet, as Siskind (1977) has
shown, the findings about the magnitude of the effect of higher wage minima
on employment seem sensitive to minor changes in the data and specification.
A more careful specification of the underlying theoretical model and more
attention to the data used could have a substantial payoff in terms of the
confidence one can place in the estimates produced. Thus, though a great
deal of research precedes this study, that research is not as thorough as
current theory and techniques enable the analysis to be.
In the next section we describe some new measures of the effective
minimum wage and examine how they affect estimates of ad hoc models of the
minimum wage's impact on youth labor markets, one of which introduces factor
prices directly into the estimating equations. In Section III we estimate
a complete system of demand equations for teen and adult labor that incorporates
the effective minimum wage within a framework based entirely on the theory
of factor demand. In Section IV we examine how changes in the effective minimum
wage change the structure of firms' costs, using a translog approximation to a
three—factor cost function involving youths, adults, and capital. In Section V
we show how to calculate the net effects of higher minima and use the method
to simulate the impact of the minimum wage on youth and adult employment and on
factor shares. As does all previous empirical work on this subject, our results
present only the net employment effects; they cannot show the larger gross effects
as workers are displaced from some firms and find employment elsewhere.II. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVE MINIMUM WAGES
ANDTHEIREFFECTS ON EMPLOYMENT
The most thorough previous work on the employment effects of the
minimum wage is based on weighted averages of legislated minimum wages relative
to average hourly earnings in particular sectors, with the weights dependent on
coverage of the minimum and on youth employment in each sector. Earnings per
hour paid for, though, are not a good measure of the cost of employment.
Required payments such as payroll taxes for social insurance, and negotiated
and unilateral payments such as bonuses, are a cost of employment. Increases
in paid holidays and vacations have imposed a growing wedge between hours
paid for and hours worked. Changes in the user cost of training will also
cause the correlation between broader measures of labor costs and average
hourly earnings to differ.
These are not minor distinctions. Real average hourly earnings (ABE) in
manufacturing rose 55 percent between 1953:1 and 1978:IV. In the same period
real compensation per hour actually worked (COSTWK) rose 93 percent, while the
sum of this measure and real user costs of training (ECNT) rose 92 percent.
Comparable figures for the private business sector are 67 percent, 94 percent
and 98 percent. Clearly, there is room for substantial differences in the
estimated effects of higher legislated minimum wages on employment depending
upon the labor cost measure to which the minimum is compared)-"
For each of the eight private nonfarm one—digit industries we form:
MINi. =(B.COVB.+ N.COVN.)/AHE. =MIN./AHE. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 (1)
where B and N are the minimum wage rates applying to previously and newly
covered workers, and COVB and COVN are the corresponding fractions of workers
—2—covered in the i'th industry.-' Alternative measures of the effective minimum,
MIN2. and MIN3., are defined by dividing (1) by the ratio of COSTWK to CaMP,
hourly compensation (wages, social insurance and pension payments), and the
ratio ECNT to COMP respectively. Since our focus is on teenage employment as
affected by changes in the minimum wage, we calculate effective minimum wage
measures for the private nonfarm sector as weighted averages over the eight
industries of MINi., MIN2. and MIN3. using each industry's share of teen
employment as its weight.!
In the top half of Table 1 we list the means and standard deviations of
the minimum wage measures for the years 1954 —1978for the private nonf arm
sector and for the three industries —services(except private household workers),
retail trade and manufacturing —forwhich there are large samples of teen
workers. The more inclusive nature of these labor cost measures ensures
that the effective minimum wage variables based upon them have lower means than
do those based on AHE. Also, it is worth noting that the effective minimum is
highest in manufacturing among the three industries considered: This occurs,
even though labor costs are higher in manufacturing, because the coverage rate
has historically been far higher there than in services or retail trade.
Finally, note that in manufacturing, though not in the other industries, the
coefficient of variation of NIN3 (.095), based on ECNT, is much larger than
that of MINi (.079), based on AHE.
These measures of the effective minimum wage compare the minimum price
employers must pay for an hour of labor to the average cost of an hour of labor.
Since most of the interest in the employment effects of the minimum wage is in
the labor market for youths, they have serious problems insofar as they are not
specific to that market. To circumvent these problems we replace AHE (COSTWK
or ECNT) in (1) by RY*AEE (or RY times COSTWK or ECNT), where RY is the ratio of
the weekly earnings of full—time workers age 16 to 24 to those of all full—time
—3—Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations of
Effective Minimum Wage Variables, 1954:11978:IV
Services Retail Manufacturing Private Nonfarm
Based on average
labor cost:
ARE .243 .237 .440 .302
(.113) (.166) (.035) (.089)
COSTWK .210 .204 .388 .263
(.095) (.141) (.034) (.073)
EC .176 .171 .336 .220
(.078) (.117) (.032) (.060)
Based on teen
labor cost:
ARE .320 .317 .568 .396
(.162) (.230) (.047) (.134)
COSTWK .278 .273 .501 .344
(.136) (.196) (.039) (.111)
ECNT .232 .228 .434 .288
(.112) (.163) (.037) (.091)workers.-" This redefinition could havelarge effects: The ratio RY was
at its highest value, .86, in the years 1954—1978 in 1955, and fell to .70
in 1977. In addition to its use in forming a better effective minimum wage
measure, we use RY to define hourly labor cost measures,-'
The means and standard deviations of the redefined effective minimum wage
variables are shown in the bottom half of Table 1. Because the teen wage
is below the average, the effective minimum measures based upon it exceed
those based on average labor costs. Also, because the coverage rate outside
manufacturing (which affects the numerator of the effective minimum wage
variable) was rising at the same time RY (which affects the denominator) was
falling, the effective minimum measures for nomnanufacturing industries based
on teen labor costs have much more variance than do those based upon average
labor costs.
Our modifications of the effective minimum wage variables in (1) have
been concerned chiefly with broadening the terms included in the denominator.
The only adjustment of the numerator has been the inclusion of social insurance
and pension payments (through COMP). If persons at the minimum wage receive
nonwage benefits (reduced hours, specific training) at the same rate as does the
average worker, the ratios MIN3 and MIN2 should equal MINi. Whether this
extreme assumption or our partial adjustment of the numerator is correct is
unknowable a priori. However, by comparing fits of employment equations using
the different measures, we can infer which assumption is superior.
Our initial approach is to estimate equations describing the behavior of
teen relative to adult employment over time. The equations have the form:
ER =*a1MINJt + ct2U+o3t + a4DUNS + (2)
—4—where ER is the logarithm of relative teen/adult employment; MINJ is the
logarithm of one of the effective minimum wage variables we constructed;
U is the logarithm of the adult unemployment rate; DIJMS is a vector of three
quarterly dummy variables, and 'isa disturbance term. This equation was
developed by Welch (1974) and used by Siskind (1977). The employment data
are monthly CPS data, seasonally unadjusted, averaged into quarterly observa-
tions. Teenagers are persons 14—19; adults are those 20 and over. Because
of the limits on the availability of data on coverage of the minimumwage by
industry, and because previous studies that used (2) started their samples in
1954, our estimates too begin with that year. Since it is likely that the
disturbances are autocorrelated, (2) is estimated in each case using the
Cochrane—Orcutt iterative technique
The results of estimating (2) for the four samples (three industries and
the aggregate of private nonfarm employment) for 1954 —1978are presented in
Table 2.11 Examining first the coefficients of MINJ in the specification
based on ABE, we find that, with the exception of services, the coefficients
on the MINJ variables are all significantly negative at the 99 percent level of
confidence. Comparing these to Siskind's (1977) estimates for 1954—68, we observe
quite similar effects. The main difference is that our elasticities have
greater statistical significance in the equations for the private nonfarm sector and
for services, and less in that for manufacturing. Despite the addition of the
extra years of data, the adjustment for serial correlation, and the use of cor-
rected series on teen employment, the estimated minimum wage elasticities
differ only slightly.-'
The discussion above is based on results using an effective minimum
wage variable whose denominator is average hourly earnings. When equations (2)
are reestimated using ?iIN2 and MIN3, we find uniformly that the explanatory
power of the model increases. Noreover, the best fits for all four data sets
are in the equations based on an effective minimum variablethat includes
—5—Table 2
Basic Equations for Relative Teen—Adult Employment, 195)4:1 —1978:IV*





AHE —.1107 .677 .033587
(—2.23) (9.16)
C0ST\K -.1062 .702 .033)478
(—2.12) (9.80)




AHE —.0219 .459 .011622
(—.43) (5.14)
COSTWK —.0227 .460 .oi6i8
(—.44) (5.15)
ECNT —.0302 .464 .071566
(—.58) (5.21)
Retail Trade:
AHE —.0410 .661 .0372)42
(—2.95) (8.76)
COSTWK —.o4ii .660 .037234
(—2.96) (8.15)
ECNT —.0418 .657 .037151
(—3.04) (8.67)
Manufacturing:
AHE —.3786 .611 .058076
(—2.86) (7.67)
COSTWK —.3198 .610 .058083
(—2.86) (7.65)
ECNT —.3988 .591 .057568
(—3.28) (1.30)
*t_statistics are in parentheses here and in Tables 3—8.ECNT, the most complete of the three labor—cost measures, in the denominator.
Not only are the fits better, the estimated minimumwage elasticities are higher
as well, by about 10 percent in the private nonfarm sector as a whole and in
manufacturing, by 50 percent (on a low base) in services, and by a tiny
fraction in retail trade.
Equation (2) is a strange hybrid whose basis in theory is quite difficult
to discern.-1 There are three problems:
(1) It appears to be a relative demand equation, yet the relative
price measure cannot be claimed to reflect the prices of the two
types of employee. Implicitly the equation states that the price
of adults (the denominator of the effective minimum) isaverage
hourly earnings (or labor costs), while the coverage—weighted
minimum (MIN) is the price of teenagers.
(2) If equation (2) is in part based on the theory of factordemand,
it puts substantial restrictions upon the adjustment of the
employment of youths and adults. Implicitly it states that employers
are concerned only about the ratio of employment in these two
groups, and that there are no separate disturbance terms that
reflect random effects in the adjustment of employment in the
two groups.
(3) If the equations are intended to reflect the demand forlabor,
they should include a scale effect, measured by the demand for
output. From this viewpoint the trend can be seen as reflecting
changes in factor productivity, but the unemployment rate is
difficult to rationalize as a good measure of shifts in demand.
As a first step toward grounding (2) in thetheory of factor demand,
we add the relative prices of teen labor and adult labor, basedon RY.
—6—We also replace the MINJ variables with MINT (the variables whose means and
standard deviations are listed in the bottom half of Table 1.), whose
denominators are based on those labor costs specific to teenagers. These
two modifications force us to reinterpret the meaning of the minimum
wage variable. Increases in that term produced by legislated increases in
MIN imply the truncation of the distribution of the marginal productivity
of teen labor. Essentially, the labor cost measures based on RY show the
average prices of teen and adult labor, while the minimum wage variable shows
how the distribution of productivity of teens is truncated from below
by changes in the legislated minimum)"In terms of Figure 1, the relative
price variable is based upon an average of the wages of teens in the shaded
area beyond MIN, while MIN, the numerator of MINT, reflects the truncation
point. This suggests that the net effect of any increase in the minimum
wage must be calculated very carefully. An increase in MIN from MIN to
MIN1 will affect both MINT and relative prices (because the truncation
point of the distribution of teen wages is changed). The cross—hatched
area in Figure 1 will drop out of the observed distribution Of wages.
The revised version of (2) is:
ERt o + iMINTt + 2 W1t + 3 Ut + t + DUMS + (2')
where WR is the log of the relative teen—adult wage or labor cost, and MINT is
in logs. The coefficient can be interpreted as showing the effect of a higher
effective minimum on relative employment if WR is unchanged. Conceptually it shows the
extra impact of a higher minimum once that effect has been compensated for by
adjusting WR to account for the increased average wage of teenagers produced
when the truncation point in Figure 1 moves rightward. The compensating change
—7—Percent of Teens
Figure 1: The Effective Minimum Wage and the Distribution of
Teenagers by Productivity
MIN0 MIN1 Productivityto hold WR constant when MIN increases must occur through a drop in wagesof
high—wage teens sufficient to offset the effect of the truncation. That 0
follows from the assumption, based on the studies surveyed in Hamermesh—Grant
(1979), that the demand elasticity for low—wage workers exceeds that for high—
wage workers; the net negative effect on teen employment of a higher MIN,
holding WR constant, results from the partly offsetting positiveand negative
effects on high— and low—wage teens respectively. This suggests that the net
effect of higher MIN must be calculated using and both (see Section V).
Table 3 presents estimates of (2') using labor cost and effective
11/ .
minimumwage variables based on ARE and ECNT.— Despite the drastic decline
in RY since the l960s, and the different bases of MINT and MINJ, the
addition of the relative labor cost variable has little impact on the estimated
minimum wage elasticity, as a comparison of the estimates in Tables 2 and 3
clearlyshows.-'Moreover, as in Table 2 the equations based on the most
complete labor—cost measure, ECNT, produce slightly better fits and slightly
higher minimum wage elasticities. Despite the stability of the minimum wage
elasticity, the inclusion of a relative price measure is justified in terms
of achieving a better fit to the data (except in manufacturing). The other
t—statistics on relative labor costs exceed one, and all the estimated
relative price elasticities are negative.
Since coverage and the legislative minimum are separate issues, we
experimented with separate variables for each. The logs of the fraction of teen
employment covered and the ratio of the minimum wage to AHE (orto ECNT
were both entered in (2'). (For the private nonfarm sector these
measures were teen—employment weighted averages of the variables for each industry.)
For retail trade and the private nonfarm sector only did o decrease. In all
four cases the larger effects were through the relative minimum; their elasticities
were —.21, —.14, —.21 and —.43 for the four equations using ECNT, and they were
significantly negative except forservices)-'Since coverage is now fairly
—8—Table 3
Estimates of (2') for Relative Teen—Adult Employment,
1954: I —1978:IV
Industry and Labor Minimum Relative
e Cost Wage Labor Cost
Series Elasticity Elasticity _______
PrivateNonfarm:
AHE —.1027 —.4116 .033505
(—2.09) (—1.55)




AHE —.0272 —1.94 .069207
(—.46) (—3.05)
ECNT —.0383 —1.96 .069144
(—.64) (—3.07)
Retail Trade:
AHE —.0403 —.4666 .037087
(—2.84) (1.43)
ECNT —.0411 —.4601 .037006
(.—2.93 (—1.42)
Manufac turing:
ARE —.4016 —.5311 .058099
(—3.05) (—.91)
ECNT —.4185 —.5652 .057572
(—3.46) (—.99)complete, any future increases in the effective minimum wage must come
through higher legislated minima. These estimates suggest that the employ-
ment effects of such increases would be more severe than implied by estimates
based on increases in the MINT variables (that combine coverage and the
legislated minimum).
III. THE MINIMUM WAGE IN A COMPLETE SYSTEM
OF DEMAND EQUATIONS FOR LABOR
In this section we generalize the model of Section II by transforming it
into a complete system of demand equations for the two factors of production,
teen and adult labor:
ETt= a1 + a1WT + iWAt + + SMINTt + K1Xt + Li , (3a)
EAt =a2+ 2t + 2WAt + )'Q +K2X+ £2, (3b)
where ET and EA are logarithms of employment of teenagers and adults
respectively; WT and WA are logarithms of labor costs per hour; Q is the
log of output; X is a vector including a time trend and quarterly dummy
variables; and the e are random disturbance terms)" It implicitly assumes,
as did Figure 1, that an increase in the effective minimum wage facing employers
of teenagers directly affects only their employment. This equation system
respecifies (2) further to account for the objections in Section II.
As it is written, system (3) imposes no restrictions on the effects of one
wage rate on employment in the other group. This allows the testing of
hypotheses stemming from factor demand theory. The theory implies the symmetry
of cross—price effects, 2 =R1,where R is the ratio of factor shares; and it
also requires that there be homogeneity in the responses of employment to changes in
all prices, i.e., ct, + 1310 and 2 + 2 =0.(We assume here and in Section IV
that the legislated minimum is included in the phrase "all prices.") The model
—s,-in (3) is estimated using the data for the private nonfarni sector underlying
the estimates in Tables 2 and 3. Separate first—order autoregressiveprocesses
are assumed for and C2, and the parameters p describing theseprocesses are
estimated. Because the fits of (3) were always slightly better when ECNT
was used, we present here estimates in which WT, WA and MINT are based upon that
15/ measure.—
The restrictions of homogeneity and symmetry cannot be rejected at the
99 percent level of significance 0(2(3) =10.72),though they can at the 95
percent level. Since the restricted system is more consistent with economic
theory, and the estimate of the coefficient on MINT from the unconstrained
model differs only slightly from that from the model in which homogeneity and
symmetry have been imposed, we present the restricted estimates in Table
The equations were estimated by iterative least—squares, aprocedure that is
asymptotically equivalent to maximum likelihood.
As a result of the imposition of the constraints, there is only one
independent coefficient on the labor cost terms, c. Though this coefficient
is negative, its t—statistic is very low. Further, the elasticity is far
below that found in Section II, and far below values that seem reasonable in
light of recent research (see Hamermesh—Grant, 1979). The output elasticity is
also quite low in light of those found in previous work (Hamermesh, 1976). It
is impossible to believe in the degree of increasing returns implied by the estimate
of y. The trend coefficients are positive and always significant. This
too is disturbing in view of the usual interpretation of them as reflecting
increases in productivity.
We added a variable like MINT, but based on adult labor costs and
employment weights, to (3b) to test whether a change in the effective minimum
wage directly affects the employment of adults. The x—test of this hypothesis
is 1.50, not significantly different from zero.--'We may conclude that our
interpretation of the effective minimum wage variable here and in Section II
—10—Table 4
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RA .998as a reflection of the truncation of the distribution of labor costs for
teenagers is not inconsistent with the data. This finding allows us to interpret
an increase in the effective minimum wage in the context of the models in (2')
and (3) as directly affecting only the employment of teenagers. There is,
though, an indirect effect on the employment of adults: With a rightward
movement in the truncation point of the distribution of teenagers' labor costs,
their average labor cost increases, and there is some substitution toward
adult workers.
The elasticity of the effective minimum wage variable is negative and almost
significantly different from zero, though its size is somewhat below that in
Section II. The basic message is that, even if we take the theory of factor
demand seriously and modify it to include the effect of the minimum wage, we still
find a negative employment effect on teenagers as the effective minimum rises.
No matter what formulation we have used —fromthe hybrid nontheoretical model
in (2) to system (3) —increasedcoverage and higher legislated minima are
found to reduce the employment of teenagers.
IV. THE MINIMUM WAGE AND FACTOR SUBSTITUTION
The theoretically based estimating models we have constructed
must stem from some underlying production or cost function. Here
we examine how the minimum wage affects the structure of firms' costs
or the nature of production using annual data on the employment of
teenagers and adults, and on services of capital. The view implicit
in the model is that a higher minimum wage constrains the factor
choices of the firm and thus raises its costs at a given output.
—11--The work in this section is based on the flexible translog form (see
Berndt—Christensen, 1974, for an early application). Throughout the discussion
we use a cost rather than a production function. Though these are dual to
each other, and thus should theoretically give identical results, this does
not in practice occur. Both the nature of the translog form as an approxi-
mation, and the problem of finding the appropriate terms —pricesor quantities —
thatcan be treated as exogenous for estimation purposes, have been cited as
causing differences between estimates produced using the cost or production
function appraoches. Although Grant—Hamermesh (1981) argue
that the production function approach, in which quantities are taken as
exogenous, is more appropriate for estimating substitution parameters
among groups of workers disaggregated by age and sex, this argument rests on
the assumed relative inelasticity of labor supply in most groups. Since that
assumption is likely to be incorrect for teenagers, the main focus of interest
of this study, and since our estimates must in any case involve a price term
in the form of the effective minimum wage, we use an approxi-
mation to a generalized cost function.
The translog cost function for this study is:
C =
Q-I-c0+c WY [WY.MINT] + 2 WA + ct3 PK
+ 1l [WY]2 + 1l [WY]2 MINT + 22 [WA]2 + 33 [PK]2
(4)
2 2 2 2
+ l2WYWA+ 12WY WA MINT+ 13WY•PK
+l3 WY PK MINT + 23 WAPK
where C are the typical firm's costs, Q is output, PK is the user cost of capital,
WY and WA are the wages of young and older workers, and the ct., cc, and .
areparameters describing the firms' costs.(All variables are in logarithms; MINT
is based on the series shown in the bottom part of Table 1.). The interaction terms
—12—between MINT and WY and the three price variables reflect the assumptions that
a higher effective minimum affects costs by constraining firms' choice of in-
puts, and that this effect works only through the price of teen labor.
We can use (4) to derive equations describing the shares of total output
accruing to each of the three inputs. Implicit in this derivation are the
assumptions of constant returns to scale and price—taking firms. The
derivation yields:
S =+ MINT + S11 WY + WY.MINT (5a)
+ l2 WA + l2 WA•MINT +l3 PKMINT;
SA =+l2 WY + l2 WY•MINT + 22 WA + 23 PK; (5b)
and
SK=c3+Sl3wY+5j3WY.MINT+5WA+5 PK, (5c)
where S denotes the share of the particular factor. We expect 13.to be such
as to imply price elasticities that are closer to zero as MINT is higher. For
example, as MINT increases, the workers who are disemployed are the lowest—
skilled, for whom the demand is likely to be most elastic (see Hamermesh—Grant,
1979); thus n, the own—price elasticit will rise toward zero. Similarly,
the substitutability of skilled and unskilled workers suggests the measured
will fall toward zero when the least—skilled youth are disemployed.
The symmetry of cross—substitution effects has already been imposed in
(5) by assumption in (4). However, homogeneity restrictions must also be imposed
if the share equations are to make economic sense. These are:
ll + ll MINT + l2 + l2 MINT + l3 + MINT 0; (6a)
l2 + i2 MINT +22+ S33= 0;
(6b)
(6c)
13 + l3 MINT + 22 + S33= 0;
and (6d)
+++ ojMINT =1.
These restrictions are quite standard in the empirical literature, though one
—13—should note that they are modified here by our inclusion of the effective
minimum wage in (4).
One more homogeneity constraint is needed to complete the model. If the
effective minimum increases, factor shares must still sum to one; the restric—
tion must hold that:
+ WY + i2 [WI + WA] + [WI + PK] =0. (6e)
Restrictions (6a through e) cannot be valid for all values of the factor price
variables and the effective minimum wage, so that there is some problem in
interpreting them. We make the assumption that each constraint holds at the
sample means of the factor prices and the effective minimum wage, implicitly
assuming that the stochastic process generating (5) conforms with the
restrictions imposed by theory only at the mean of the process. To denote
this, we write superior bars over the price terms in (6); because of the
constraints (6), equations (5) contain eight independent parameters. This
model too is estimated using iterative least squares.
The capital stock data cover both private and government capital, and are
from Freeman (1979). The user cost of capital is computed accounting for
changes in the tax treatment of capital, depreciation and capital gains. Data
on the labor quantities and prices are based on the Money Incomes of Families
and Persons (CPR Series P—60). The estimates cover twenty—one annual observa-
tions, 1955—1975. The input prices WY and WA are based on the annual incomes
of full—time, year—round workers ages 14—24 and 25+ respectively. Both WY
and WA were deflated to constant 1972 dollars using the deflator for the
private business sector. Factor quantities were computed as full—time
equivalent employment by prorating the total number of persons in each age
group who reported some earnings by the ratio of their earnings to those of
year—round, full—time workers. Thus we are implicitly assuming that each
person in the two labor subaggregates works the same number of hours.-'
—14—Table 5 shows the estimates of the parameters in (5). Those in the
first column are based on a model in which all terms involving MINT have
been deleted (in which and the have been set equal to zero); those
in the second column are based on the complete model in (5). It is worth
noting that the fit of the complete model is statistically better than that
of the model from which the minimum wage terms have been excluded: The
x2—statistic describing this test is 29.01, significantly different from
zero at the 99 percent level. Most of the parameter estimates in the full
model are quite significant, though l2 and some from the terms in MINT
are not. (This undoubtedly results from the instability induced by the
small share of costs accounted for by young labor. As shown in Grant—
Hamermesh, 1981, it is difficult to get sensible parameter estimates from
systems like (5) when the average shares become small.) Given this problem,
we should not expect high levels of significance for any of the estimated
effects of the minimum wage on the substitution parameters that we calculate
below.
We can use the estimates in the second column of Table 5 to calculate the
implied partial elasticities of substitution, own substitution elasticities,
and cross— and own—price elasticities. Partial elasticities of substitution
are calculated from (5) as:
... MINT
=ij:ij + 1 , (7a)




+1 — . (7b)
Cross— and own—price elasticities are calculated from (7a) and (7b) respectively
by multiplying by the share of the factor whose price is assumed to change.
—15—Table 5
Estimates of Parameters for the Three—Factor Translog Cost Functions



























lnL 142.64 157.14Table & lists the values at the sample means of all the substitution
and price elasticities involving youths.2.2' The formerare also presented
as linear functions of the logarithm of the effective minimumwage. The
estimated demand elasticity for young workers is quite low,—.59, though not
nearly so low as that produced in the system in Section III (asystem, though,
that excluded capital). We find here that workers in thetwo groups are
substitutes on average during the sample period. Young workersand capital are
found to be complements, though the cross—priceelasticity is essentially zero,
and its accompanying t—statistic is tiny.
The most important finding of this section is implicit in therepresenta-
tion of the substitution elasticities as linear functions ofMINT in Table 6.
Increases in the effective minimum wage during the period 1955—1975reduced
the own—substitution elasticity of demand foryoung workers and decreased the
extent to which employers were able to substitute older foryoung workers in
response to an exogenous increase in the price of young workers. Basedupon
the value of MINT in 1955, =—.718,and =.643;for 1975 the
comparable elasticities are —.233 and .500. We observe the same result for
YK' though the very low t—statistic attached to the estimate prevents us
from drawing any useful inferences from it. These estimatesprovide evidence
for our rationale for including the minimumwage in the cost function (4).
They imply that a higher effective minimum wage induces a rigidity into firms'
responses to exogenous changes in factor prices by restricting therange of
choices. This inference is strengthened by the calculation that theestimated
C/ MIN >0;we estimate that increases in the legislated minimumwage
raise the estimated total cost, as logicsuggests they should.
V. THE NET EMPLOYMENTEFFECTOF THE MINIMUM WAGE
AND SOME POLICY SIMULATIONS
Here we use the results of Sections II—IV to analyze the effectsof changes
in the FLSA. The effects cannot simply be computedon the basis of the estimated
—16—Table 6
Substitution Parameters and Price Elasticities from the
Translog Cost Model, 1955—75
Partial Elasticities of Substitution
YA YK
As function of 1.180 .654 .465
MINT +8.00 MINT —.233 MINT +.383 MINT
At mean of —9.53 .966 —.049
MINT (—2.30) (1.98) (—.08)
Demand Elasticities
nYY YA YK
At mean of —.590 .605 —.0156
Y1INT (—2.30) (1.98) (—.08)minimum wage elasticities, for changes in the legislated minimum or its coverage
will change average labor costs. This will have an additional effect on teen
employment through the variable WT included in (3) or in (2').
Writing all prices in logs, assume that the distribution of WT (teen
labor costs) is normal. Then, following Johnson—Kotz (1970, Volume 2, p. 81),





where f is the normal density function; F the normal distribution function;
p is the mean of the untruncated distribution; and aisits standard deviation.
From (8) the derivative of the mean of WT with respect to an increase in the
effective minimum wage produced by an increase in MIN is:
dWT/dMIN ={f(•)/[l-F()] + f2()/[1-F(.)}2) ,(9)
where ()denotesthe argument has been suppressed.
Remembering that ER and WR are differences in logs of teen and adult
employment and labor costs reprectively, and treating MINT as MIN —WT,we
can write:
dET/dMIN =aET.,MINT [l—dWT/dMIN] + [ET/aWT] {dwT/dMINI. (10)
The partial derivatives in (10) are either the regression coefficients from
(2') under the assumption that adult employment is not directly affected by
changes in MIN, or from (3). Therefore, if we evaluate the effect of an increase
in MIN on the truncated mean of the distribution of teen labor costs, we can
evaluate the net effect of changes in MIN on teen employment.
We make three alternative assumptions about how changes in the legislated
minimum wage truncate the distribution of teen labor costs:
(1) All unemployed teens owe that status to the effects of the minimum
wage, but teens who are out of the labor force are unaffected;
(2) The fraction truncated is equal to the highest fraction of teens
—17—(.115) inferred as disemployed in the Meyer—Wise (1981) estimates of
wage distributions of teens;
(3) Same as (1), but using the teen labor force, L, as a base ratherthan
the teen population, P.
Based on averages from 1954:1 to 1978:IV the fractions truncated under
assumptions (1) and (3) are .069 and .149 respectively. We assume that
cY,thestandard deviation of the untruncated wage distribution, equals 1 or
.5. (The latter figure is roughly in line with the Chiswick—Mincer (1972)
estimate for the truncated distribution for adults, and with Meyer—Wise
(1981) for the untruncated distribution for teens.)
In Table 7 we examine the employment effect of a youth subniinimum wage
equal to 75 percent of the adult minimum. The calculations ignore scale
effects; only substitution between teen labor and other factors is dealt
with. The estimated impacts of the 75 percent subminimum are not small,
especially if we assume that the average wage of teens would decline as
low—wage teens become employed. We have, though, ignored any changes in
compliance and in the use of student exemptions that mightoccur.-'
The estimates in Table 7 can be used with additional assumptions to
gauge the total impact on teen and adult employment of a 75 percent
subminimum. The substitution effects on teens are as listed in that table;
the disemployment effect on adults is:
dEA =(3FAjwT)(dWT/dMIN)dMINT.
Assuming that truncation of the teen wage distribution is based on U/P
(.069 of the distribution is truncated), and that a= .5,dEA=—.089
percent. This compares to dET =2.86percent, shown in Table 7. Making a
conservative assumption about the share of output accruing to teens at the
minimum wage, the scale effect is .161 percent.--' Based on 1979 employment
of 9356 thousand teenagers and 88,961 thousand adults, we infer that a 75
percent subminimum would create 283 thousand jobs for teens and 62 thousand
—18—Table 7
Percentage Effect of a 75 Percent Youth
Subminimum on Teen Employment or Relative
Teen/Adult Employment
Based on:
Teen Employment Relative Teen—Adult
(Table 4) Employment
(Table 3)
Standard Deviation a a








No Truncation 2.40 2.40 2.95 2.95
Unemployed Ratio (.069) 2.63 2.86 5.01 7.07
16—24 Year—olds 2.71 3.02 5.72 8.49
Disemployed (.115)
Unemployment Rate (.149) 2.76 3.12 6.14 9.33jobs for adults. Using the same estimates of ET/MINT and dWT/dMIN, but
using o and GYA from Table 6 (implying greater own —and cross—price effects),
the job creation estimates are 523 thousand and —230 thousand respectively,-'
Different estimates will be produced depending upon assumptions about
dWT/dMIN. However, though the scale effect may be small, the direct effect
on teen employment (through dET/dMINT) is large enough that with reasonable
estimates of substitution possibilities between youths and adults, far more
teen jobs would be created than adult jobs lost.
Finally, though we cannot draw any direct inferences about how a higher
effective minimum affects the size distribution of income, we can use the
results in Table 5 to calculate the effect of a given increase on the shares
of income of each of the three factors. These are given by:
S MIN =l2dMIN [MINT —WY]+ WY} + 12dMIN (lla)





In Table 8 we list these partial derivatives and some estimates of what
intrasample changes in MIN have done to the estimated factor shares, using (=1and
the same three assumptions about the truncation point. The estimates imply
that the gradual increase in the effective minimum wage raised the shares of
capital and youth and lowered adults' share of total factor returns. That this
happened is implicit in our earlier findings that the demand for younger
workers is less than unit elastic, and that younger and older workers are
substitutes.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
We have provided several advances over the previous literature on employ—
—19—Table 8
Effects of Increases in the Legislated Minimum Wage
on Factor Shares, Based on Table 5
S/aMIN Increase of MINT from
1968: IV to 1978: IV
Share of:





No Truncation .0138 —.0769 .0631 .0021—.0115 .0095
Unemployed Ratio .0156 —.0594 .0438 .0023—.0089 .0066
(.069)
16—24 Year—olds
Disemployed (.115) .0162 —.0533 .0371 .0025—.0081 .0056
Unemployment Rate .0165 —.0498 .0333 .0025—.0075 .0050
(.149)ment demand and the minimum wage. The more complete measures of labor
costs we have developed uniformly improve the fit of equations describing
relative teen—adult employment and increase the estimated (negative)
response to increases in the effective minimum wage. The employment
elasticities generally remain significant and of roughly the same magnitude
when these equations are respecified to give them a basis in demand theory.
If one views increases in the effective minimum wage as constraining
firms' choices on factor inputs by restricting the range of employees who
may be hired, one can model a cost function that includes the minimum wage.
We estimate equations implied by such a function for three inputs———workers
14-24, workers 25+, and capital. Higher effective minima have reduced firms'
ability to substitute among groups of workers in response to exogenous
changes in their relative wages. This is"consistent with the notion that, by
restricting employers' choice sets, higher minima add rigidity to the labor
market.
The most striking finding of this study is the remarkable robustness of
the negative teen employment elasticity in response to higher minimum wages
and expansions of the coverage of the minimum wage, holding output constant.
Regardless of the choice of wage measures or the choice of models, the elasticity
for the private nonfarm sector is on the order of —.1. Though these
minimum wage elasticities do not seem very large, one must remember that they
are estimated over a period that saw a tremendous increase in the effective
minimum wage. Thus the implied effect of expansions of the minimum wage law
on teen employment has been substantial. A youth subminimum wage would have
offset some of these effects, with relatively little displacement of adult workers.
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1. The labor cost series are described and listed in Hamermesh (1981). They
are based on combining information from the biennial Chamber of Commerce
series on employee benefits with BLS quarterly series on compensation
and monthly series on average hourly earnings by sector. Data on the
user cost of training are constructed using assumptions about the burden
of cost of specific training and estimates of cross—section regressions
that include terms for experience and tenure, and thus allow the estimate
of the effects of firm—specific experience.
2.The data on coverage by sector are unpublished and were provided to me by
the staff of the Minimum Wage Study Commission. Data on the legislated
minima applicable in each sector are from published information from the
U.S. Department of Labor, Employment Standards Administration.
3.None of the previous studies of the employment effects of the minimum
wage has gone beyond using ARE as the denominator of an effective
minimumwagemeasure.
-
4.For 1967-1978, RY is the ratio of the usual weekly earnings of full—time
workers ages 16—24 to those of all full—time workers. The ratio is based
on unpublished data provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Since
those series only began in 1967, for 1955—1966 we prorated the ratio of
incomes of full—time, year—round workers, ages 14—24, relative to incomes
of all full—time, year—round workers, by the usual weekly earnings
ratio for 1967. Since no data on the incomes of young full—time, year—
round workers were available for 1954, we arbitrarily assumed that the
ratio RY was identical in 1954 and 1955.
5. For youths the labor cost measure is calculated as A1IE.t .RY,where i is
the industry and t the quarter. (COSTWKj or ECNTi could be used in place of
AHEj.) For adults, labor costs are (W—eWT)/(l—e), where W is the average
labor cost in the industry at time t, WFis the labor cost for youths, and
and e is the fraction of young workers in the industry at time t.
6.Welch (1974) used ordinary least squares estimation for the private non—
farm sector, but took into account contemporaneous correlation of the
residuals in the equations for the three industries. (He also estimated
an equation over a composite of all other industries.) Since auto—
correlation is likely to be the most severe problem in time—series esti-
mation, the use of the Cochrane—Orcutt procedure is probably the best
choice if one wishes to go beyond least squares.
7. For the private nonf arm sector and each of the larger industries
the time trends in (2) were positive and significant. All the coef—
ficient estimates on the adult employment variable were negative and
significant.
—23--8.Mincer (1976) found the addition of lagged effective minimum wage
terms significant, though Welch (1974) did not. Though the sum
of the terms in an eight—quarter Almon lag structure estimates
using a quadratic without end—point constraints differed little
from the coefficients of MINJ in Table 2, the specification did
lower &slightlyexcept in retail trade.
9.Other studies, such as Mincer (1976) and Ragan (1977), mix elements
of demand and supply models. Only Welch—Cunningham (1978) has a sound
basis in the theory of factor demand, and that study has problems with
its attempts to disaggregate teen labor into three subgroups to find
substitution elasticities within the teen group.
10.Clearly, there may be some "bunching" of the distribution at the.
minimum. For our argument to hold, though, we only require that a
higher minimum cause a greater truncation of the distribution.
11. To examine whether induced disemployment elsewhere affects employment
in a specific sector, MINT for the private nonfarm sector was added
to the equations for each of the three industries. In no case was the
coefficient on this variable significantly different from zero, nor did
its addition ever change the coefficient of MINT, in Table 3 by more
than one standard error.
12. With the introduction of the relative price variable the importance
of a simultaneous—equations bias may be increased. (Insofar as the
effective minimum wage variable includes an average wage, it exists
already in (2) and in equations estimated by others.) To account for
this (2') for the private nonfarm sector was reestimated using an
instrumental estimate for WT in the relative price and the MINT variables.
(The instrumental equation included the numerator of (1), DUMS, and
teenage and adult population. The coefficient of the minimum wage
in this equation was .032; its t—statistic was 1.58.) The reestimation of
(2') yielded a relative price elasticity of —2.41 (t= —2.34), but a
much lower elasticity on MINT, —.027 (t =—.42).
13. The other coefficients in the equations changed only slightly, and,
as before, the fits in the equations using ECNT were better than in
those using ARE.
14. The output measure is gross domestic business product deflated by
the gross domestic product deflator. These series were from the
CITIBASE file.
15. Variables based on AHEwerealso used in estimating (3). As in Section
II, we found that the fits were slightly inferior, and the estimated
minimum wage elasticities were slightly lower in absolute value.16. In the system in which only homotheticity has been imposed, the
coefficient on MINT, along with it t—statistic, is —.056 (—1.13).
17. We know from Grossman (1980) that increases in the minimum wage
have only slight effects on wages above the minimum. Insofar as young
workers have less human capital, this evidence for the assertion that
attention be directed toward the effect of higher minima on the employ-
ment of youths corroborates our result.
18. As a check on the validity of using capital stock and user cost series
together with labor input and price data constructed from an entirely
different source, it is worth reporting some statistics describing these
data. The mean shares are .0619, .6263, and .3118 for youths, adults,
and capital, respectively. Moreover, the mean annual full—time earnings
seem quite reasonable in light of previous work.
19. Implicit in the calculations of nandAbased on (7) is the assumption
that the effective minimum wage sThys uncanged as WY varies.
20. Ashenfelter—Smith (1979) build a model that suggests firms will decrease
compliance as the effective minimum rises. While they present no direct
evidence on this, they do show the widespread nature of noncompliance.
21. This is derived by assuming that the share of youths earning at or below
the minimum is .56 percent, based on the assumption that one—third of
all teens earn the minimum or less, that their average wage is half that
of other teens, and that teens' share of output is 3.3 percent.
22. The implied T is calculated asa, (—9.53) times the share of teens
(.033). This latter is calculated as teens' share of labor earnings
from Section III times labor's share from Section IV.AT is just cTYA
(.966) times .033.
—25—